In continuation of my commentary on the Chicago Fire Department's history, following Part 1 which can be found here, I want to delve into the peculiar saga of the infamous "Snorkel Squad 3." It remained operational for over two years without a proper Snorkel until recently, when it was finally reclassified as Rescue 3 alongside Snorkel Squad 2. While this may seem absurd, there was indeed a rationale behind this decision, albeit a flawed one. The superficial explanation points to a consultant study known as the Maatman Report, but this doesn't fully capture the complexities involved. Ultimately, the city's reluctance to allocate sufficient funds for maintaining adequate staffing levels and stationing resources played a significant role.
The city of Chicago had initially engaged Gerald Maatman, head of the Illinois Institute of Technology's Fire Science program and founder of the National Loss Control Service Corporation, to conduct a comprehensive review of the Chicago Fire Department back in 1963. This extensive analysis encompassed station locations, fire company distribution, and strategies to enhance the department's operational efficiency. One of the primary goals was to improve the city's AIA fire insurance rating, which successfully transitioned to a Class 2 status the following year. Notably, the AIA has since evolved into ISO and was once called the National Board of Fire Underwriters. Although the 1963/64 Maatman report was generally well-received, recommending the construction of new fire stations and reallocating resources to underserved areas, it stopped short of suggesting any cuts to existing manpower levels. In fact, some recommendations even called for adding personnel to certain fire companies.
Fast forward to 1968, when another Maatman report was commissioned, revealing stark contrasts with its predecessor. Significant changes had occurred by this point. In 1967, the department introduced an additional day off for firefighters without corresponding increases in staffing levels, exacerbating the already dire manpower shortages. By mid-1968, nearly all squad companies had been decommissioned, leaving only a handful of fully-staffed units. The city's financial constraints were clearly influencing these decisions, prompting the need for yet another review.
The revised 1968 report proposed reducing the majority of engine and truck companies to four-person teams while establishing six specialized "Flying Manpower Squads" equipped with six members each. Downtown areas retained five-person crews where possible. Additionally, the report advised eliminating all Snorkel Squad operations, retaining only Salvage Squad 1 as the sole squad company. Equipment previously exclusive to Snorkel Squads began integrating into standard engine and truck units, reflecting a shift towards maximizing resource utilization.
Beyond restructuring, the report suggested placing ladder pipes on every truck company and adjusting Snorkel placements to focus on high-risk zones. These recommendations aimed to optimize response times and firefighting capabilities amidst budgetary limitations. Despite these measures, the challenges facing the Chicago Fire Department during this period were profound, impacting everything from operational readiness to public safety expectations.
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